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There has been a sudden expansion and interest in Indian Political 
Thought (hereafter IPT) (Datta & Palshikar 2013: 1-2) and this review 
article seeks to map its changing trajectories. One marked difference 
among these new publications on IPT from previous ones, like V. R. 
Mehta’s Foundations of Indian Political Thought (1992), is the depar-
ture from the conventional approach of studying IPT through politico-
intellectual biographies. Thus, Datta, Palshikar and Vanaik’s edited 
book on IPT critically evaluates the state of research in ancient, medi-
eval, and modern IPT1 and identifies the gaps in the field and possible 
lines of enquiry in the future. Gurpreet Mahajan’s book focuses on how 
concepts central to the modern democratic political imaginary of India 
like freedom, equality, religion and diversity were interpreted in Indian 
thought and how they shaped the political institutions and practices of 
independent India. Ananya Vajpeyi retraces the field of modern IPT to 
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examine how India’s canonical figures thought about Indian selfhood. 
C. A. Bayly’s book maps the history of political thought in India with a 
specific focus on liberalism and demonstrates how Indian intellectuals 
contributed substantively to the making of liberal thought. 
 The aforementioned books provide a comprehensive coverage of the 
ideas of Indian political thinkers, specifically of modern IPT. As such, 
three out of the four books under review come under the rubric of 
Modern Indian Political Thought; and only the ICSSR edited volume by 
Datta et al. covers the entire spectrum of ancient, medieval, and mo-
dern IPT. Thomas Pantham observes an “essential continuity” (an 
assumption which this review article seeks to problematise) between 
ancient and modern Indian thought seen clearly in the works of 
Dayanand Saraswati, Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Vivekananda, 
Aurobindo and M.K. Gandhi. He therefore feels that an analysis of 
ancient Indian thought constitutes a prolegomenon to the study of mo-
dern IPT (Pantham 1986: 16). A different view of Datta and Palshikar 
demonstrates how the “discovery” of IPT took place at a time of 
intense consolidation of a modern political tradition of thought that had 
developed through movements against the British colonial rule in India 
(Datta & Palshikar 2013: 3). 
In this review then, modern IPT is the focus, but ancient and 
medieval Indian political thought provide the wider context through 
which the production, expansion, and changing trajectories of IPT are 
mapped. In their introduction to Indian Political Thought, Datta and 
Palshikar note that this current interest in IPT has sprung conversa-
tions about the possibility of IPT emerging as “Indian Political Theory.” 
While recognising the hierarchy between thought and theory, Datta 
and Palshikar ask, whether IPT is better described as it stands, rather 
than as theory? In order to answer this question, they raise a pre-
liminary problem: “Can we, in our insistence on the distinctiveness of 
the ‘Indian’ in ‘thought,’ erect a division with the ‘West’?” That is, is it 
possible to recover an authentic Indian thought different from Western 
theory (ibid.: 2)? The books under review, in my view, contribute to 
answer these questions. For instance, the conceptual framework of the 
authors exemplifies how to understand the division between Indian 
and Western political thought. Additionally, these books also contribute 
to the ongoing debates in intellectual history – global and Indian (cf. 
Capper, La Vopa & Phillipson 2007; Moyn & Sartori 2013). 
Ananya Vajpeyi’s book Righteous Republic: The Political Foundations 
of Modern India engages with the question of how the Indian sub-
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continent’s rich knowledge traditions of two and a half thousand years 
influenced India’s nationalist leaders as they undertook the task of 
constructing a nation during Britain’s colonisation of India. Vajpeyi 
states that five prominent “founding” figures – M.K. Gandhi, Rabin-
dranath Tagore, Abanindranath Tagore, Jawaharlal Nehru, and B.R. 
Ambedkar – engaged themselves with the question of swa (self) in 
'swaraj'. In the context of India’s anti-colonial movement, the term 
swaraj did not just signify self-rule as political independence; it also 
signifies “rule by the self” and “rule over the self” (Vajpeyi 2012: ix). It 
therefore meant both – the struggle for India’s sovereignty and its 
quest for the Indian self that would allow it to come into its own as a 
modern nation-state. Vajpeyi maintains that it was this word which 
dominated Indian politics from the 1880s, when the Indian National 
Congress was founded, until India’s independence in 1947 (ibid.: 1). 
While swaraj is the ligature between 'self' (swa) and 'sovereignty' or 
'rule' (raj), it is the latter which, in Vajpeyi’s opinion, has dominated 
the historical narrative of the creation of the Indian nation. She seeks 
to correct this neglect by arguing that in their collective search for 
Indian selfhood, the “founders” were deeply influenced by Indian 
traditions of moral and political thinking and turned to ancient and 
classical texts, ideas and ideals in formulating their political values and 
vision. She identifies particular classical texts that each of these 
founders took recourse to in order to understand Indian selfhood. She 
follows Gandhi’s reading of the Bhagavad Gita to show how this en-
gagement yielded the category 'ahimsa', that is, “the self’s orientation 
towards others […] devoid of the intent to harm”. For Rabindranath 
Tagore, she chooses the fifth century Sanskrit poem by Kalidasa, Me-
ghaduta, a text whose principal category according to her, is 'viraha', 
“the self’s longing, a yearning for reunion with a beloved who has been 
estranged […]” (ibid.: xxii). The longing for the beloved, a metaphor 
for India’s estranged past, is tinged with the knowledge that this loss 
can never be recovered. 
For Abanindranath Tagore, she treats the term ‘text’ broadly to 
include Abanindranath’s Shah Jahan paintings, which yielded for the 
painter, the category of 'samvega' – the self’s “aesthetic shock,” an 
experience that “produces both the momentary pleasure of art and the 
abiding knowledge of truth” (ibid.). The self’s shock is the self-
recognition, an ability to know the truth about itself when it comes 
face to face with powerful aesthetic representations of itself (ibid.: 25). 
Nehru’s fascination and engagement with the texts and artefacts of the 
Mauryan Empire (320-185 BCE), specifically the moral edicts of 
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Emperor Asoka, and the Arthasastra (a treatise on statecraft) of 
Kautilya, yields the categories of 'dharma', “the self’s aspiration, its 
tendency towards its own perfection,” and 'artha', “the self’s purpose 
[and] its ability to act in goal-oriented ways”. Finally, for Ambedkar, 
Vajpeyi focuses on his reading of the Buddhist canonical literature, 
especially Dhammapada, in the last stage of his life, because it is here 
that Ambedkar, in her opinion, discovered 'duhkha', “the self’s burden, 
which is… the suffering, individual and collective, produced in any 
society […] immiserated by caste” (Vajpeyi 2012: xxiii). 
According to Vajpeyi, from mid-1890s onwards, Indian nationalists 
faced a political crisis that led to their quest for the sources of the 
Indian self. In their search for the self, the five founding figures in her 
book looked to the past for “understanding the self whose sovereignty 
they sought,” and “delved deep into the texts, monuments, traditions, 
and histories of India” to reboot and rejuvenate a tradition in crisis as 
a result of colonial encounter (ibid.: xiii-xiv). Vajpeyi’s study of the 
founders’ search for self is informed by Alasdair MacIntyre’s under-
standing of tradition in terms of an “epistemological crisis” and an 
“epistemological break.” In her reading of MacIntyre, an epistemo-
logical crisis is a state of affairs which affects the consciousness of 
either an individual or culture, wherein existing epistemologies, or 
ways of knowing, fail to acquire the knowledge necessary for under-
standing and explaining the world in the present. Further, a crisis in 
the self is also traceable to and concomitant with a crisis in the tra-
dition that has formed the self (ibid.: 57). 
For Vajpeyi, founders like Gandhi and others2 resolved this crisis in 
the Indian political tradition by engaging with classical texts and 
concepts and thereby made an epistemological break by reorienting a 
tradition in crisis and rejuvenating it in the nineteenth and the twen-
tieth centuries. Implicit in this central claim of Vajpeyi’s is an under-
standing of the Indian tradition (which in her view begins with the life 
of Buddha in the fifth century BCE) with an internal coherence and 
continuity traceable right up to the twentieth century. The Indic here is 
also an indigenous political tradition, where such “indigenism” assumes 
that the historical trajectory of each society is incomparably peculiar, 
and should be analysed as far as possible by its own ‘‘internal’’ con-
cepts (Kaviraj 2005: 501). 
This approach to the intellectual history of modern India in terms of 
an indigenous, and coherent and continuous tradition defies her own 
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observation of the Indian political tradition as constructed in modern 
times where certain accounts of the past were left out because  
they are relatively recent; others because they regionally con-
strained; some because they are affiliated to Islam or to minority 
religions; many on account of their uncertain or supposedly low-
caste status; some because they are miscegenated with “foreign” 
cultures; and yet others because they do not bear a strong 
relationship to any of the subcontinent’s languages that were 
transregionally powerful prior to English: Sanskrit, Pali, Tamil, 
and Persian. (Vajpeyi 2012: 12) 
The six Indic categories that Vajpeyi associates with the five founders 
– ahimsa, viraha, samvega, dharma, artha, and duhkha – are neither 
western, nor political categories. For her enquiry it is crucial that these 
are non-political Indic categories. She asks: 
Why are we so surprised to discover traces of millennia-long 
debates and traditions in the thought of modern India’s founding 
fathers? [...] Did we think...that knowledge of the self, the central 
concern of Indic civilization for the entire length of its existence, 
had simply been erased from Indian minds by the late nineteenth 
century? Or did we become so distracted by how Indians dealt 
with Western categories – capital, reason, justice, race, nation, 
citizenship, science, democracy – [...] that we lost track of con-
tinuities in Indic political thought from a long precolonial history? 
(Vajpeyi 2012: 26) 
An enquiry into the genealogy of Indic categories, then for her, refo-
cuses our attention to the presence and importance of these concepts, 
which, in her opinion, have been consistently ignored in IPT. She also 
observes that for many scholars of the Subaltern Studies like Ranajit 
Guha, Shahid Amin, and Partha Chatterjee, the invocation of Indic 
categories among Indian nationalists simply mirrored and reinforced 
Western categories such that any investigation on IPT stops at a “deri-
vative discourse.”3 Vajpeyi further argues that while many of the 
Indian political categories like 'danda' (punishment) and obedience by 
'bhakti' (devotion) were co-opted into the dominant ideology of rule of 
the colonial regime, the fact of the non-political nature of her Indic 
categories did not lend them to be easily usurped by or be useful to a 
polity which is thoroughly Western in its conception and form. It seems 
that implicit in her anxieties about the derivative nature of Indian 
concepts and the co-option of Indian political concepts by western 
(colonial) structures of power is the assumption that the adoption of 
western concepts and the use of Indic political concepts (like danda 
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and bhakti) by Indian thinkers did not involve the same kind of new 
meanings and creativity that she finds in her non-political Indic cate-
gories. 
However, Sudipta Kaviraj argues that when a European concept 
enters Indian society and works through a translating term in the 
vernacular, often the traditional concept which is discredited, dis-
placed, or undermined by the modern European one, continues as a 
shadowy existence of subterranean influence, subtly refracting the 
meanings of the modern term (Kaviraj 2002: 100).4 Further, Datta and 
Palshikar point out that contemporary Indian political thought has 
explored the hybrid character of a series of preoccupations that have 
been debated in the West like debates on public sphere, civil society 
and citizenship.5 They give the example of the debate on secularism in 
India which has included radical interrogations of the concept of 
secularism, positing different versions of toleration, the distinctiveness 
of Indian secularism and so on.6 As a result, Datta and Palshikar 
maintain, in these elaborations, that the position and significance of 
Western thought has changed as a necessary relational framework. 
This dynamism in IPT has been embodied over time in the way that 
the West has figured in recent times in contemporary Indian political 
writings, ranging from sharp division of the Indic from the West to the 
more nuanced double position of the West: “as both the frame of 
contrast and a constitutive element of the ‘Indian’” (Datta & Palshikar 
2013: 6-7).7 
Vajpeyi’s six Indic categories which correspond to five founders’ 
search for self – ahimsa (non-violence) with Gandhi, viraha (longing) 
with Rabindranath Tagore, samvega (shock) with Abanindranath 
Tagore, dharma (norm) and artha (purpose) with Nehru, and duhkha 
(social suffering) with Ambedkar – are the central concepts through 
which the founders resolved the crisis in the self. While for Gandhi 
ahimsa was indeed the central concept in his political thought and 
action, evidenced in his books (like Hind Swaraj and The Story of My 
Experiments with Truth), articles, letters and speeches, for the other 
founders we do not have similar evidence to construe the above-
mentioned Indic categories as the fundamental principles of their 
political thought and action. For instance, in the chapter on Abanin-
dranath Tagore Vajpeyi imputes the category of samvega on him 
through Ananda Coomaraswamy (an historian and philosopher of 
Indian art) who translated it as “aesthetic shock” (Vajpeyi 2012: 129-
31). Thus, samvega is not a term that Tagore used to express his 
emotions about India’s national art, rather it is Vajpeyi’s own charac-
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terisation of what this painter experienced in his encounter with the 
history of Indian art. 
Further, her book provides thin textual evidence and analysis in 
terms of how these founders (save Gandhi) defined these terms and 
linked them to their larger political vision. As such, the analysis of 
these Indic terms are based on Vajpeyi’s interpretations of them and 
less on how these founding figures understood them. Had she clearly 
introduced these categories as heuristic devices that she developed to 
understand the texts and ideas of these figures, one may not have 
wondered whether these terms were used by the founders themselves. 
However, she claims, “duhkha, Ambedkar’s category, shares with 
Gandhi’s ahimsa, Rabindranath’s viraha, Abanindranath’s samvega, 
and Nehru’s dharma the peculiar quality of being a hybrid between 
non-modern and modern meanings of the term; an apparently archaic 
concept deployed at an utterly unprecedented historical conjecture for 
pressing political reasons [...]” (ibid.: 21, emphasis added). To argue 
that the founders ‘deployed’ these Indic categories and concepts 
requires that the author shows textual evidence of such deployment in 
the works of these canonical figures. Despite such methodological 
vagueness, Righteous Republic is an attempt to pave a new trajectory 
of modern IPT as it paints a novel picture of the moral imaginary of the 
founders’ thoughts through a detailed exercise in intellectual history 
and critical philology. 
As discussed above, there are two assumptions implicit in Vajpeyi’s 
Righteous Republic; first, that of a division and distinction between an 
Indic/ indigenous thought and Western thought, where the former 
being consistently ignored needs to be retrieved and revived, and 
second, that of the derivative nature and co-option of Indian political 
concepts by Western categories and structures of power. Gurpreet 
Mahajan’s book, India: Political Ideas and the Making of a Democratic 
Discourse (2013) questions these two assumptions by arguing that the 
specificity of the “Indian” in IPT needs to be understood in terms of 
“difference,” by which she means the distinct meanings we associate 
with concepts that mark our historical time (Mahajan 2013: 8). To 
elaborate, her enquiry into the history of ideas is informed by a notion 
of a “historically situated self,” wherein, this notion following Gadamer 
foregrounds a fusion of horizons. Such a conception of the self as-
sumes that individuals are constituted through a productive interaction 
between “the prism of culture in which they live, and the horizon that 
marks their historical universe. The play of these two horizons shapes 
the historically situated self” (Mahajan 2013: 6). 
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Difference then, for Mahajan, needs to be understood in terms of 
how values get articulated in a particular context. She argues that 
constructing an Indian Political Theory through such a framework does 
not require us to search for authentic Indian concepts, or probe where 
the idea first originated, or whether the concept exists in the voca-
bulary of a given culture. It requires one to examine the way ideas, 
irrespective of where they originate, enter into public discourses and 
shape the political imagination of the people (Mahajan 2013: 6). The 
project of constructing an indigenous social science and political 
theory, on the other hand, Mahajan argues, is rooted in a conception 
of difference and cultural membership where it is assumed that each 
culture and civilisation is unique, it has its own system of values, ways 
of thinking, and means of evaluating what is good and desirable (ibid.: 
2). Doing Indian political theory through such a framework involves 
that one searches for authentic indigenous concepts (in order to reject 
the hegemony of western categories and concepts), retrieve and revive 
them.8 
According to Mahajan such a search for an authentic indigenous 
knowledge rests upon notions of cultural essentialism and incom-
mensurable difference and the notion of the self here is based on an 
idea of a “culturally embedded self,” a self that is rooted in its tradition 
and cultural way of life. Mahajan finds “strong methodological reasons” 
for grounding IPT based on a notion of historically situated self. She 
maintains that throughout India’s struggle for freedom, as well as in 
the Constituent Assembly (which framed the Constitution of indepen-
dent India), concepts such as liberty and equality, state and bureau-
cracy, were used without anxieties about their origin. The social and 
political leadership in modern India invoked these concepts to think 
about their own social and political situation and aspirations, and in 
doing so imbued them with new meanings (ibid.: 7). Thus, through a 
specific understanding of difference, Mahajan maps the journey of 
ideas of equality, freedom, religion and diversity in Indian political 
thought which, for her, are the central categories in understanding the 
distinctiveness of India’s democratic discourse. 
Mahajan argues that while liberal political philosophers like Hobbes, 
Locke and Mill envisaged the political in terms of the relationship 
between the individual and the state, in India the community (such as 
a religious or a language community, or caste-based and tribal com-
munities) also configured the political. Democracy in India therefore 
involved a triadic relationship of the state, the community and the 
individual. She begins with the idea of equality/ inequality that shaped 
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India’s modern democratic imaginary. It is interesting to note that the 
author construes the concept of equality as equality/inequality. Maha-
jan articulates this concept in this way because she observes that 
discussion on equality in colonial India was almost always understood 
as the absence of existing structures of inequality and oppression. She 
contends that while most writings assumed a fundamental equality of 
all persons as human beings, Indian thinkers and socio-political leaders 
primarily attempted to identify the prevailing structures of inequality, 
and associated equality with the absence of these relationships. Thus, 
Mahajan points out, one rarely gets a clear enunciation of the idea of 
equality independently of the existing structures of exploitation and 
subordination (Mahajan 2013: 13). 
She identifies four figures central to debates on equality/inequality 
namely, Jyotirao (Jyotiba) Phule, Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, B.R. 
Ambedkar and M.K. Gandhi. The first two figures of the mid-nineteenth 
century, in her view, offered two distinct representations of the idea of 
equality/ inequality that formed two ends of the spectrum within which 
this concept came to be discussed in later years. The latter two early 
twentieth century socio-political leaders gave a new articulation to 
these two different notions of equality/ inequality. She argues that 
while Phule and Ambedkar saw the caste system as the root cause of 
inequality which was responsible for the oppression and subordination 
of the ‘Shudras’ (people at the bottom of the caste hierarchy), in 
Bankim and Gandhi’s works there was a recognition that the centres of 
exploitation were many, each equally important and irreducible to one 
another. All these structures of domination and exploitation – like, 
subordination of Indians by the British colonisers, the domination of 
women by men, of the labouring poor by the capitalists, and of the 
lower castes by the upper caste Brahmins – needed to be challenged 
and rejected.  
Mahajan contends, “When India began the task of framing its 
constitution these two dominant conceptions of a just and equal 
society informed the discussions in the Constituent Assembly. The idea 
that there were many different sites of inequality and oppression in 
society – something that figured centrally in the analysis by Bankim 
Chandra Chattopadhyay and Gandhi – was the point from which the 
deliberations began. But, within this larger understanding, it was 
caste-based inequalities [...] that remained a constant point of 
reference” (ibid.: 32). 
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Mahajan’s next central concept of freedom charts out the varied 
conceptions of swaraj, and like Ananya Vajpeyi she notes the layered 
meanings of the term. To unveil the varied notions of freedom or 
swaraj in Indian thought, Mahajan mainly discusses this idea in the 
works of Sri Aurobindo, Swami Vivekananda, M.K. Gandhi, and 
Rabindranath Tagore. She argues that swaraj, when understood in its 
limited form as political freedom, was considered to be an essential 
condition of human well-being without which one could not lead a 
decent life. Without swaraj, one not only could not imagine a good life, 
it also hindered the possibility of enjoying basic rights such as the right 
to speech, thought and expression. Political freedom and self-
government was desired because it would provide a responsible 
government that would protect and promote the interests of the 
people and give them an opportunity to determine their own future. 
Since swaraj also meant self-determination, spiritual (internal) 
freedom was closely intertwined along with the conception of political 
(external) freedom. Spiritual freedom, Mahajan observes, was 
understood in different ways as “inner freedom,” “self-dependence,” 
and “self-reliance.” However, at the most basic level, being morally 
and spiritually free, or self-determining meant being “true to one’s 
being” (Mahajan 2013: 45). 
On the question of when is one true to one’s being, Mahajan notes, 
there were significant difference of views. She outlines three different 
interpretations of this idea which surfaced in the public domain and 
offered three different conceptions of political citizenship and of the 
nation. The first perspective maintained that being true to one’s self 
meant abandoning of all forms of Western influence and being shaped 
by the Indian civilisation. Mahajan notes that the idea of ‘swadeshi’ 
captured this sentiment (Mahajan 2013: 46). In the economic sphere, 
swadeshi involved giving up goods manufactured in factories abroad 
and endorsing products produced in the villages of India. In the 
political sphere it asked for self-rule, and in the cultural sphere, this 
idea was expressed sharply in the writings of Vivekananda and 
Aurobindo, who called for cultural self-determination.  
Mahajan identifies the second perspective with Gandhi who sug-
gested that it is by following one’s moral conscience that one could be 
truly self-determining. This was a consciousness that emerged “from 
an engagement with existing traditions and the truths that were em-
bodied in them” (ibid.: 50). Freedom here entailed recognising one’s 
situatedness (that is, being part of a community, a tradition, a species, 
and the universe) and the obligations that this form of being placed 
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upon each of us. In other words, freedom here meant voluntarily act-
ing in a responsible way and recognising for oneself what one owes to 
others. In such a conception, political freedom, while desirable, was 
not a sufficient condition for being free. It had to be accompanied by 
the necessary condition of inner freedom. For Gandhi, this was to be 
cultivated through the practice of ahimsa or non-violence, which invol-
ved action motivated by love and compassion towards all others. The 
third point of view emerged in the writings of Tagore who associated 
swaraj with the freedom of the mind and spirit, and sought to create a 
space to think for oneself and express one’s views without fear. For 
Tagore, realising true swaraj entailed challenging and overcoming the 
social and political boundaries constructed by society such as, religion, 
caste, language and nationality, and seeing oneself as a part of the 
humankind.  
Mahajan states that while all these conceptions of swaraj were 
different in significant respects, each of them challenged the con-
ception of man and freedom that prevailed in the scientific rationality 
of the post-enlightenment world (Mahajan 2013: 56). As opposed to 
enlightenment reason which separated reason from passion/emotion, 
these conceptions of swaraj invoked the category of the spiritual to 
refer to “a perspective in which reason was moderated by the moral 
and/or the aesthetic so as to arrive at a truth which allows the self to 
transcend the limits imposed by ego and perspectivism” (ibid.: 58). 
With regard to the influence of ideas of swaraj on India’s modern 
democratic imaginary, she concludes by observing that: 
The votaries of swaraj had emphasised [...] individual respon-
sibilities and obligations to the larger whole [...] Individuals were 
expected to realize the truth for themselves and determine what 
was right and appropriate. This understanding had to be arrived 
at by the self, and not imposed from the outside even by an 
enlightened other [...] It was this centrality accorded to the 
individual that made room for individual liberty within these 
frameworks and prevented the collective speaking on behalf of its 
members. This element changed in the post-independence period. 
From being mindful of the presence of the other, there was a 
marked shift to making the group speak for the individual. The 
effect of this move and the altered relationship between the 
individual and the collective have been manifest most sharply in 
matters involving freedom of expression (Mahajan 2013: 68-9). 
For Mahajan two other concepts that shaped India’s democratic 
imaginary are religion and diversity. She observes that religion emer-
ged in the public domain in colonial and post-colonial India in three 
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different but interrelated ways: (i) as a site of and resource for 
change; (ii) as a ground for political mobilisation and the construction 
of identities; and (iii) as a mode of training the will and arriving at the 
true purpose of one’s existence (Mahajan 2013: 73). Mahajan’s discus-
sion on religion shows a dual and conflicting representation of religion: 
while religion was associated with spiritual truth, as a source of moral 
and social ethic, and as a means of preparing the will, it was also a site 
for the formation and mobilisation of identity.  
She maintains that this dual representation of religion framed the 
discussions of the Constituent Assembly on matters relating to religion. 
While the instrumental use of religion created anxieties (which emer-
ged from the experiences of the demand for a separate homeland for 
the Muslim community (Pakistan, and the Partition and communal riots 
that followed in its wake), the Constituent Assembly members also 
recognised that religion was an important source of personal identity 
and the basis of a moral ethic. Therefore they struck a balance bet-
ween these two different conceptions of religion. Instead of treating 
religion as a purely personal matter that must be restricted to the 
private domain, the Constituent Assembly accepted its public dimen-
sion and made room for it in the public domain (ibid.: 84). 
This de-privatised nature of religion in India has led to a greater 
intervention of the state in matters of religion. Due to Indian state’s 
continuous engagement with religion (for example, the legal ban on 
the prohibition of ‘Dalits’ (the ex-untouchable castes) into temple 
entry), critics of secularism in India question or even deny secularism’s 
applicability and usability in India (Nandy 1998; Madan 1998; Chatter-
jee 1998). Indian secularism, it is argued, has been unable to erect a 
‘wall of separation’ between religion and state/ politics that western 
secularism demands. In making a case for the distinctiveness of Indian 
secularism, Rajeev Bhargava has argued that unlike western secular-
ism where separation entails mutual exclusion of religion and politics, 
secularism in India is based on the idea of “principled distance.” The 
policy of principled distance, he states, takes a flexible approach on 
the inclusion or exclusion of religion, engagement or disengagement of 
the state, which at the level of law and policy depends on the context, 
nature, or current state of relevant religions (Bhargava 1998: 519-20). 
In discussing the last value of diversity, Mahajan points out that for 
several leaders diversity (religious, linguistic, and cultural) was a 
distinctive attribute of India and valuing it was a natural expression of 
who ‘we’ are as a people (Mahajan 2013: 129). After illustrating how 
 REVIEW ESSAY/FORSCHUNGSBERICHT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
283 
diversity was an important value for leaders like Nehru, Iqbal, Gandhi, 
Tagore, and Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, she argues that while the majority 
and the minorities began with a shared view about India’s diversity, 
they conceptualised the relationship between diversity and unity 
differently. For the minorities, unity was frequently predicated upon 
separate recognition of their contribution and needs so as to ensure 
their equal membership in the polity (Mahajan 2013: 103). For the 
minorities, recognition of difference could not be simply based upon 
the good faith and promise of the majority. It required formal in-
stitutional arrangements by way of special consideration, separate 
representation, space for community institutions and cultural rights. 
Mahajan further contends that it is the anxieties of the minority 
populations that structured deliberations of the Constituent Assembly 
and the thinking about the constitution of independent India. She also 
points out that while most of the time multicultural theorists speak of 
cultural diversity in terms of its survival and protection, diversity in 
India demonstrates that one cannot speak of it in the singular. One 
needs to consider the question of which diversity must be accommo-
dated and how? She argues that India has not been able to determine 
a suitable criterion for differentiating between the claims of different 
minorities that desire to protect their cultural diversity. Thus, the 
question, as to who receives recognition in India, Mahajan observes, 
has been settled on an ad hoc basis, often depending upon the capa-
city of groups to muster political support (ibid.: 118-9).   
Thus, Mahajan provides a comprehensive account of how Indian 
thinkers and leaders layered familiar concepts of freedom, equality and 
difference with new meanings and signification. However, in her book 
one is unable to see these political ideas in terms of alternative 
conceptions in the thoughts of various Indian intellectuals. So for 
instance, in her discussion on diversity one does not get a clear 
understanding of Gandhi’s views on diversity, or how it differed from 
say, Iqbal’s views on diversity. This may be because she adopts a 
methodology where the focus is less on individual authors and more on 
multiple meanings of individual concepts which are central to the 
modern democratic imaginary in India. Nevertheless, Mahajan’s book 
moves beyond the conventional thinkers-centric understanding of 
political thought to explicate the distinctiveness of IPT through a 
framework of concepts/ ideas informing her study. 
While Vajpeyi and Mahajan reconfigure the ‘Indian’ in IPT, 
Christopher Bayly’s book, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the 
 REVIEW ESSAY/FORSCHUNGSBERICHT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
284 
Age of Liberalism and Empire (2012) shows how liberalism was not 
simply a British tradition but rather a transnational creation, such that 
understandings of liberalism in colonial India influenced British, 
European and American attitudes to the world. In his book, Bayly aims 
to show that Indian intellectuals contributed substantively and 
originally to the making of liberal thought. Thus for him, understanding 
the genesis of liberalism in India reveals much about its nature in 
Europe, America and beyond. By demonstrating how ideas that we 
associate with major Western thinkers – like Mill, Comte, Spencer and 
Marx – were received and transformed by Indian thinkers and public 
intellectuals in the light of their own traditions, Bayly situates the 
debate on IPT in the context of global intellectual history. Through a 
broad construal of the term liberal, Bayly re-evaluates the political and 
social thought of Indian liberals from 1800 to 1950. He argues that 
liberal ideas were foundational to all forms of Indian nationalism and 
the country’s modern politics. He contends, “Indian liberalism as a 
diffuse sentiment and a set of loose political practices has apparently 
outlasted socialist centralisation, Gandhianism and even, thus far, 
Hindutva” (Bayly 2012: 357). 
To charges of ‘inauthenticity’ and ‘derivativeness’ of liberal ideas in 
modern IPT, Bayly points out that even if Europeans or Americans set 
the broad terms of debate, Indian intellectuals did not simply copy 
Western ideas. Instead, “they cannibalized, reconstructed and re-
authored these ideas, often using them in an intellectual assault on the 
policies, moral character and culture of their rulers” (ibid.: 3). He 
further maintains that all modern political languages have mixed to-
gether global and local discourses such that it would be difficult to find 
any single global movement of political ideas which could not be 
characterised in those terms (ibid.: 8). Indian liberalism for him repre-
sents a broad and internally contested range of thought and practice 
directed to the pursuit of political and social liberty. He identifies 
freedom (from colonial rule, traditional authority and corrupt domestic 
or religious practices), political representation, free press, individual 
property rights and education (particularly of women) as the common 
features of Indian liberalism (ibid.: 1). 
Bayly insists that through liberal ideas, arguments and practices, 
Indian liberals not only resisted colonial rule, but also engaged in 
debates about the ‘good life’ as would-be citizens of a global republic. 
The political ideas of these liberals even when transformed beyond 
recognition by their political successors and enemies were, in his 
opinion, formative of India’s modern ideologies and institutions. Thus, 
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he argues, Indian liberals may even have helped to provide some of 
the conditions for the emergence of India’s democracy (Bayly 2012: 
343-4). The historiography of Indian liberalism in Bayly’s book can be 
broadly divided into three phases: (i) the dominance of constitutional 
liberalism from 1820s to 1880s (ibid.: 42), (ii) the emergence of, as 
Bayly terms it, “communitarian liberalism” in the 1860s and its 
dominance in the 1890s (ibid.: 15, 245-76), and (iii) the decline and 
transformation of liberal ideologies in India after the First World War 
(ibid.: 276-342). 
The first phase of constitutional liberalism is characterised by the 
critique of colonial authoritarianism, demands by Indians for freedom 
of press, place in jury service, and support for constitutionally limited 
government. The next phase of communitarian liberalism is different 
from the communitarianism of Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel 
which is opposed to liberalism in its emphasis on the individual self’s 
cultural embeddedness. Bayly’s communitarianism is akin to the liberal 
communitarianism of T. H. Green and William James (ibid.: 245). 
Bayly argues that this type of liberalism was concerned with the fate of 
society rather than the individual, was more hospitable to the idea of 
state intervention in the economy, and emphasised the notion of com-
mon good. The third phase begins in 1919 and continues till 1950. This 
is the phase when liberalism as an ideology declined and survived in 
the form of “hybridized and modified indigenous ideologies” (ibid.: 
277). Here, in Bayly’s view, liberalism survived as a residual tradition 
through the political thoughts and practices of people like Radhakumud 
Mookerji’s “economic regionalism,” Ambedkar’s “counter-liberalism,” 
and even among proponents of Hindu nationalism, Muslim separatism, 
integral nationalism and orthodox Marxists (ibid.: 276, 310). 
As Bayly traces the genealogy of Indian liberalism, he not only 
attempts to show the elective affinities and divergences between 
Indian and classical British liberalism, but also Indian liberalism’s 
engagement with other traditions which it drew on and through which 
it reworked its arguments giving it its specific character. The latter two 
exercises show the frequently tense relationship between Indian and 
British liberal values. Let us first begin with some of the analogies that 
Bayly draws between Indian and British forms of liberalism. As people 
living under colonial rule, the ideas of J. S. Mill particularly on freedom 
of opinion and the limitation of government resonated with Indian 
liberals. Mill’s support for local representation as a moral as well as 
political necessity appealed to Indian leaders who were demanding 
their place in grand juries, municipalities and legislative assemblies. 
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However, Indian liberalism also differed from Millian liberalism. 
Bayly argues that Mill’s individual autonomy based on “comprehensive 
liberalism” was rejected by Indian liberals. Mill’s “harm principle,” 
which forbade society’s intervention in the individual’s freedom to 
impose public morality, unless his or her behaviour harmed others, 
was challenged with the notion of “social rights” by Indian public intel-
lecttuals. As per the idea of social rights, state restrictions on 
individual liberty is justified (for example, alcohol consumption) if it 
threatens to erode the social fabric of society. Bayly says that Indians 
strengthened this notion of social rights by adding arguments of Indian 
custom and tradition. This appeal to social rights allowed for argu-
ments to be made for the banning of cow-slaughter which was seen as 
an invasion of Hindu social rights, as also the opposition to the practice 
of playing music before mosques on grounds of social rights of Muslims 
(Bayly 2012: 15-6). 
Other issues on which Indian liberals contested key elements of a 
metropolitan liberal consensus from mid-century onwards were free 
trade and racist assumptions of British civilisational superiority. Bayly 
observes that Indian economic liberals questioned the idea of free 
trade well before German economic nationalist Friedrich List’s argu-
ments for the protection of national economies were disseminated in 
India. He demonstrates how in the 1820s Rammohan Roy approved 
the limited colonisation of India by skilled European settlers so as to 
break East India Company’s monopoly. Later the idea of 'drain of 
wealth' from India took much greater force in the arguments of public 
intellectuals and economic nationalists like K. T. Telang, Dadabhai 
Naoroji and R. C. Dutt. 
But Indian liberalism also influenced and was influenced by a 
number of other “recessive traditions.” Bayly argues that the selective 
use of ancient and medieval texts – the Mahabharata, the Bhagavad 
Gita, and the Ramayana – provided both liberals and conservatives 
with arguments against British liberalism. So, ideas of Brahmanical 
immunity were used to strengthen the sacrosanct nature of property 
and references to ancient ‘constitutions,’ conciliar advice (the pari-
shad) and local assemblies (the panchayat) buttressed the demand for 
self-government under the Company and the Raj. Muslim liberals like 
Sayyid Ahmed Khan and Syed Ameer Ali drew on Indo-Muslim ethical 
literature (akhlaq) to argue for the importance of Indian counsellors to 
advise the British rulers (ibid.: 20-1). Bayly notes that by 1914, Indian 
liberalism, which had always stressed the individual in community, 
further drifted towards communitarianism. Here Bayly broadens the 
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definition of liberalism to include its southern and central European 
variants. He further says, “the idea of communitarianism employed 
[here] […] tinged all political positions, from neoconservatives, through 
advocates of violence in the service of the nation, to liberals and even 
idealist socialists […]” (Bayly 2012: 245). 
This broad definition of communitarian liberalism allows Bayly to 
include communal Hindu political figures like Madan Mohan Malaviya, 
whom he construes to be a communitarian liberal (ibid.: 222).9 
Further, in the last chapters of his book, leaders and thinkers with as 
different ideological persuasions as Nehru [“it was his liberal, rather 
than his socialist political judgement which characterized Pandit’s rule” 
(Bayly 2012: 353)], B.R. Ambedkar [“he remained typical of late 
Indian liberalism in many ways” (ibid.: 305)], M.N. Roy [“he inherited 
fragments of the old liberal sensibility and its projects” (ibid.: 320)], 
Subhash Chandra Bose [“his thought retained a strong tincture of the 
old liberal internationalism” (ibid.: 327)], and S. Radhakrishnan [“he 
epitomised the neo-vedantist humanist liberalism” (ibid.: 333)], 
among others, are shown to have components of liberal thought in 
their political vision and practice. Many of these leaders that Bayly 
pronounces as liberals explicitly rejected this description. 
Of course, affinity to liberal thought can be found in many such 
leaders who did not define themselves as liberals. Sugata Bose there-
fore rightly points out that the question is never asked as to why those 
Indians who set out to recover liberties, national as well as social, 
tended to shun the liberal label (Bose 2012: 306). Also, this loose use 
of the term liberal by the author leads the concept to lose its concept-
tual and analytical specificity. Thus we see that Bayly is at pains to 
show that Indian liberals were neither mere ‘mendicant office-seekers’ 
nor ‘inauthentic mimic men’ as some post-colonial writers have held 
them to be. While liberalism came to be widely employed as a langu-
age of colonial domination, Bayly shows that Indian liberals constantly 
subverted colonial and elite interpretations of liberalism, decon-
structing and reassembling British liberal ideas and liberally borrowing 
transnational ideas to reflect Indian conditions and structures of 
thought. 
In the introductory paragraph of this review article it was observed 
that the production and ‘discovery’ of IPT coincided with a need for a 
past of political thought felt by the anti-colonial movements in colonial 
India. In order to examine the changing trajectories of modern IPT, it 
was claimed here that we must also examine the field of ancient and 
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medieval IPT. Therefore let us begin with Kumkum Roy’s essay, 
“Revisiting Early Indian Political Thought: Texts, Practices, Material 
Culture,” in the edited book Indian Political Thought by Datta, Palshikar 
and Vanaik (2013).  
Roy begins her discussion on early IPT by drawing our attention to 
the ideal of kingship as it emerges through two recent translations of 
the classics of the Sanskritic/Shastric tradition – the Manavadharma-
shastra, popularly known as the Manusmriti (Olivelle 2005 cit. in Roy 
2013) and the Santi Parvan of the Mahabharata (Fitzgerald 2004 cit. in 
Roy 2013). She argues that while textual traditions, often identified as 
Shastras, have remained central to our understanding of early Indian 
political thought, it is necessary to bear in mind that there were other 
linguistic, textual, and oral traditions in early India. She urges us to 
see the Sanskritic/Brahmanical tradition itself as having grown through 
dialogue and contestation with these other traditions like the early Pali, 
Prakrit, and Tamil traditions. She observes that both Olivelle and 
Fitzgerald who have translated and annotated these classics attempt to 
locate them in a more delimited historical context. As such, their cons-
trual of these texts is embedded in the political, social, and religious 
environments within which they were generated (Roy 2013: 65-8). 
Olivelle notices a flexibility and fluidity in different Shastras, a 
tradition that is claimed to be constant, if not consistent. An illustration 
of the fluidity in the Manusmriti is the redefinition of 'dharma'/ 
'dhamma' within the Asokan regime. The word dhamma, during the 
reign of King Asoka (304-232 BCE), no longer retained its specific 
association with the Brahmanical definition. It was redefined to incor-
porate a range of broader, more universalistic, albeit nebulous set of 
ethical concerns like respect for parents, teachers, elders, as well as 
the practice of generosity, kindness towards slaves and labourers, and 
so forth (Roy 2013: 71). Similarly, Fitzgerald has also highlighted the 
context sensitivity and therefore alternative possibilities of the cate-
gory of dharma. Roy argues that the implicit and often explicit conflicts 
among these strands of dharma are not always resolved harmoniously 
such that dissonances abound and leave space for readings that were 
not standardised (ibid.: 74). She also reminds us of the drawbacks of 
focusing exclusively on the pan-Indian Shastric tradition and therefore, 
goes on to discuss the Kavya tradition (poetry, drama and fiction 
written in highly artificial Sanskrit literary style employed in Indian 
court epics from the early centuries of the Common Era)10 and the 
material culture/archaeological remains as embodiments of early In-
dian political ideas and processes. 
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At this point one may pause and ask whether the knowledge of 
these texts is of any relevance today, specifically to contemporary IPT? 
We have already seen how for Vajpeyi Nehru’s search for self was 
structured around old Indic categories of dharma and artha. It is 
through these traditional categories, Vajpeyi has argued, Nehru 
negotiated the challenges encountered in the present. Historians like 
Romila Thapar have carefully scrutinised classical texts and traditions 
to challenge the proposition of contemporary scholars (like Ashis 
Nandy and T.N. Madan) that secularism is alien to Indian civilisation. 
She demonstrates that an element of “proto-secularism” is visible in 
earlier heterodox traditions of Buddhism, the Bhakti tradition (part of 
Puranic Hinduism), the Sufi tradition etc. (Thapar 2012: 75-86). More 
recently, Rajeev Bhargava has argued that the Asokan edicts of third 
century BCE opened up a “conceptual space” that contributed to the 
growth of modern secularism in India (Bhargava 2014: 173-202).11 
All these contemporary writers have attempted to re-read classics, 
be it texts or artefacts, in order to locate answers for contemporary 
issues that beset modern society. And most of these scholars have also 
reiterated the diversity, fluidity, and flexibility that characterise clas-
sical texts and traditions. As is evident already, these scholars have 
not reverted to the classics in order to draw timeless, eternal wisdom 
to illuminate the present (which may also be important); rather the 
classics have been a source to examine the ways in which our tradi-
tions have shaped our understanding of the present. 
Writing on the recent scholarship on the political thought of the 
‘middle period’ (eighth to eighteenth century CE), Nandita Sahai also 
presents studies that go beyond the elite, formally political, discursive 
texts of the so-called medieval period. In her essay, “Revisiting Middle 
Period Political Thought: Texts, Practices, Material Culture,” she begins 
by noting the dissatisfaction among historians with the various ways of 
periodising Indian history. She points out that while the colonial/ 
communal historiographical categories of the “Hindu” period followed 
by the “Muslim” stand rejected today, so does the subsequent deploy-
ment of a “secular” tripartite division of “ancient,” “medieval,” and 
“modern.” As this latter typology was seen to construe the medieval 
period as a single unchanging entity and failed to take cognisance of 
substantial transitions within its chronological span, it was also found 
wanting. This latter categorisation, she observes, were later broken 
down into “early medieval,” and “early modern” phases. 
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However, even these new categories carried some of the erstwhile 
concerns and hence, historians have begun to deploy the neutral 
category of middle period. Despite these historiographical advances, 
Sahai argues that the middle period of Indian history continues to be 
imagined as “Muslim India”.  She however notes that in the last de-
cade the scholarship has become increasingly cognizant of the multipli-
city of texts and traditions (which are also derived from the indigenous 
Hindu traditions – Brahmanical and heterodox) that proliferated in the 
middle period (Sahai 2013: 90). Sahai proceeds to examine works that 
have delved into the internal differentiation and historical develop-
ments within both the “mirror of princes” (adab) literature on the one 
hand, and the Shastric tradition on the other. 
She then discusses the ascetic cultivation of the body of the king for 
the Mughal political culture of Akbar’s times. Here she also notes the 
importance of harem and the norms of conduct for the members of the 
harem. She further examines the monarchical strategies of commu-
nicating power of the king through the visual language of paintings and 
architecture. Another interesting theme that Sahai discusses is the 
literature that has delved into the political significance of courtly 
practices, and the sartorial styles of kings. Through such discussions, 
Sahai demonstrates that there was a gradual process of blending and 
assimilation of ideas and practices recognised as “Hindu” and “Muslim” 
that played out over six centuries. She argues that this gave rise to 
the “Indic” and “Islamicate” categories such that “there was no single 
dominant tradition, and the result was a range of dynamic political and 
social alignments” (ibid.: 111). 
Now we turn our discussion back to modern IPT and begin with the 
essay titled, “Time and Knowledge,” authored by Prathama Banerjee. 
Banerjee argues that the question of time and knowledge where time 
is redefined as secular time in modernity (as opposed to say, eschato-
logical time of earlier times), is central to modern politics. While in 
earlier times politics did not necessary see time as linear, progressive, 
homogeneous, and forward looking; the temporally charged voca-
bularies of modern politics (like transition, modernisation, progress, 
development and revolution) share the assumption that human beings 
can change their social and political institutions towards a higher and 
better future with the right kind of knowledge. Banerjee argues that 
the configuration of politics, time and knowledge in these terms is 
specific to modernity (she identifies this period between roughly late 
eighteenth and late twentieth century). 
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Banerjee argues that till the 1970s time and politics in Indian 
academics was thought through the hegemonic colonial binary of 
tradition versus modernity (that is, 'traditional' India and 'modern' 
West) and from the 1980s onwards there has been a rethink on 
tradition and modernity. She divides her survey on time and know-
ledge around three broad heuristic rubrics. Firstly, she discusses works 
that have questioned the purity, priority, and universality of the 
European modernity. One, recent research demonstrates that modern 
knowledge forms (for example, medicine, meteorology, forensics, 
political economy etc.) and social scientific categories (for example, 
race, tribe, caste etc.) were not produced in Europe a priori but 
emerged out of the imperatives of colonial governmentality.  There-
fore, it was no longer possible to think of the modern as innocent of 
the colonial, and simply as progressive and emancipatory. Two, recent 
research has also questioned the apparent universality of the modern 
temporal imagination, which argues that all nation-states must travel 
the path of advancement already charted out by Europe. Thus, Dipesh 
Chakravarty talks about the “provincialization” of European history, 
that is, the local, contingent, and the particular nature of modernity in 
the West. 
Additionally Sudipta Kaviraj offers a “revisionist” theory of moder-
nity. Arguing for a “sequential reading” of the history of modernity, 
Kaviraj states that the precise sequence in which the constituent pro-
cesses of modernity appear in a particular society (like, democracy, 
individualism, capitalism and so on) determines the specific form of 
modernity in that context. For instance, in the Indian case, democracy 
comes before the coming of individualism, capitalism etc. and leads to 
a different political dynamic from that of England. Three, a result of 
two is that there is no singular modernity in the world, and therefore 
we should talk about multiple or heterogeneous modernities. Four, by 
showing that modernity always exists in the form of ‘hybridities’, 
recent research has also questioned Eurocentric claims of pure or 
originary modernity (Banerjee 2013: 33-4). 
Secondly, an important implication of this recent scholarship on 
modernity, discussed above, is that it has opened up the question of 
historical periodisation and it has destabilised history as a discipline 
leading to a rethinking of the public and political life of history. Here 
Banerjee explores the workings of history at such sites as testimonies, 
monuments, and autobiographies. Thirdly, she discusses works which 
question the idea of a singular world history governed by the logic of 
capitalism. For instance, geographers like Sharad Chari and Vinay 
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Gidwani question the global, capitalist present, and analyse colonial 
archives to demonstrate how a specific space-time emerges historically 
as both a moment and an interruption of the “time of capital” which is 
the singular, global history of capitalism. Further, Partha Chatterjee 
differentiates between “corporate” and “non-corporate” capital. Others 
still, like Aditya Nigam argue for a space of “non-capital” in everyday 
practices of livelihood, trade, manufacture and migration (Banerjee 
2013: 50-1). Finally, Banerjee surveys works which seek to recover 
histories suppressed by the nationalist temporal scheme brought in by 
the post-colonial and the post-national temporal sensibilities. Thus, 
through a discussion on time and knowledge in contemporary IPT, 
Banerjee shows the distinctive formulation of the question of time as 
political, as opposed to its conception as a philosophical project in 
Western scholarship. 
This next essay by Krishna Swamy Dara titled “Demystifying 
Democracy in the Dalit-Bahujan, Adivasi, and Feminist Discourses” 
surveys the Dalit literature in IPT. He begins by surveying political 
thought in thinkers like Jyotirao Phule, Iyothee Thass and E. V. 
Ramaswamy Naicker or 'Periyar' to explore the emergence of Dalit-
bahujan thinking, the question of Buddhist identity, and the influence 
of Thass on Naicker’s self-respect movement. Dara also surveys works 
on Ambedkar and Phule in scholars like Valerian Rodrigues (1993, 
2002), Anupama Rao (2009), and Christophe Jafferlot (2003). He next 
looks at debates on the question of labour and whether one can as-
sume that all ‘Bahujans’ (the masses which constitute, in academic 
and administrative parlance, the 'other backward classes' or OBCs) are 
part of labour, or whether labour itself is a differentiated category such 
that there is division of labour along caste lines. Using insights from 
postcolonial and postmodern theories, in the next section, Dara notices 
that a lot of research has been generated on the role of colonial 
encounter in shaping caste as we know today, such as Nicholas Dirks’s 
Castes of Mind (2001). 
He then goes on to explore the problem of domination of Indian 
academia by Brahmanism and solutions presented for the inegalitarian 
nature of social science academia. This issue, he notes, has raised the 
question as to whether only the Dalit can theorise for himself, as also 
the need to acknowledge the specificity of Dalit experience. Dara then 
discusses Dalit politics and movements that have emerged within the 
democratic framework of India. He observes that democratic institu-
tions are used by the lower castes, particularly Dalits, to gain political 
power rather than to attempt to undermine or reject them. In this 
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section, Dara also reviews works by Gopal Guru who has argued that 
humiliation is a socio-political tool for the upper castes and this 
category should be identified as the core politics of Dalits in India. In 
the next section, Dara points out not only the emergence of Dalit 
feminism, which has challenged the hegemonic assumptions of Brah-
manical feminism, but also internal debates and differences within 
feminist movements. He maintains that both these factors have helped 
democratise movements and radicalise feminist thinking in India (Dara 
2013: 210). 
In the final section of his essay, Dara examines the ‘Adivasi’ 
(indigenous/tribal people) political discourse. The case of Adivasis is 
different because firstly, they are not interested in transforming 
society but in preserving their habitations and their status. Secondly, 
the very term tribal/Adivasi is problematic due to its association with 
colonialism and the fact that this category seeks to suppress the 
massive differences among them in geographical, cultural, and histori-
cal terms. Since Adivasis are regarded as backward, they have been 
located in relationship to the issue of development of which they are 
the primary sufferers. For instance, Dara points out that  in their book, 
Ecology and Equity (1995), Ramachandra Guha and Madhav Gadgil 
link issues of development, deforestation and displacement, where 
tribals have become “ecological refugees” in the process (Dara 2013: 
213). In conclusion, Dara observes that there is no such thing as 
Adivasi political thought in the same manner as Dalit-Bahujan or 
feminist thought. Yet Adivasi political leaders have actively fought for 
rights of self-governance and access to natural resources unhindered 
by governmental agencies, rather than simply being passive subjects 
who are victims of exploitative developmental projects (ibid.: 222-3). 
The essay by Rinku Lamba “Nationalism” attempts to outline the 
diverse narratives of Indian nationalism by taking Partha Chatterjee’s 
influential explanation on Indian nationalism as the starting point. 
Chatterjee emphasises the distinctiveness of anti-colonial nationalism 
in India by articulating the influential distinction between an inner and 
an outer domain. He argues that alongside a contestation with the 
colonial power in the domain of the outside, which is the material 
domain of the state, there also existed another site of struggle, the 
“inner domain,” which reveals Indian nationalism’s distinguishing 
feature. This inner domain is where the anti-colonial nationalism 
created its own domain of sovereignty within the colonial society, well 
before it began its political battle with the imperial power. So while the 
nationalists acceded to the superiority of the West and emulated them 
 REVIEW ESSAY/FORSCHUNGSBERICHT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
294 
in the domain of the “outside” – of the economy, statecraft and science 
– there was a staunch refusal on the part of the nationalists to permit 
colonial power’s intrusion in the inner domain which was seen as a 
marker of India’s cultural identity. 
At the same time, the form of modern community endorsed by the 
Indian nationalist elite was imitative of the structures of disciplinary 
power seen in the institutions of the modern colonial state (although 
Gandhi’s notion of community provided an exception, but historically it 
was a doomed alternative). Here Chatterjee laments that the root 
cause of “postcolonial misery” lies not in an “inability to think out new 
forms of the modern community but in [...] surrender to the older 
forms of the modern state” (Lamba 2013: 123). Lamba argues that 
what remains unavailable in Chatterjee is an explicit articulation of the 
kind of community that can offset the realm of disciplinary power 
(ibid.: 125). 
By making a distinction between emancipatory and disciplinary 
facets of institutional power, Lamba draws attention to other ways of 
looking at the state-community relationship, like in the writings of 
Phule and Ambedkar. She shows how both Phule and Ambedkar 
recognised the emancipatory potential of intervention of law-state 
combine in matters pertaining to religious community. The Ambed-
karite vision demonstrated aspirations towards a communicative and 
associative democratic political community grounded in notions of 
freedom, equality, and fraternity (ibid.: 127-28). These examples 
show that there can be a multiplicity of perspectives about state power 
in colonial and post-colonial contexts. Lamba also notes that Chatter-
jee articulates a thesis that views the logic of capital to be antithetical 
to the notion of community. That is, the only form of community 
acceptable to capital is the nation-state that, allegedly, is a homo-
genising instrumentality incapable of coping adequately with questions 
of ethnicity (ibid.: 125). 
Lamba says that the scholarship of Rajeev Bhargava, Sunil Khilnani 
and Sudipta Kaviraj offer resources to study ideas, institutions, and 
politics without entirely subsuming them under the requirements of the 
logic of capital. For instance, Kaviraj has noted that Nehruvian 
nationalism, which turned out ultimately to be politically successful, 
was only one among several possibilities that loomed during the phase 
of anti-colonial nationalism. He has further observed an enchantment 
with the state in modern India which stems from the fact that the low 
castes can use the state to address the indignities imposed by the 
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caste order. This, Kaviraj opines, has contributed to a transformation 
of the basic language of Indian politics, which is the turn towards 
vernacularisation of democracy (Lamba 2013: 131). Lamba goes on to 
scrutinise Chatterjee’s critique of civil society and his formulation of 
“political society.” She raises questions about the extent of the divide 
between these two spheres and whether they cannot be seen as 
different modes of operating within democracy. 
Apart from the structural resemblance between civil society and 
political society, Lamba also notes that both these sites of democratic 
practice are equally susceptible to the dangers of democracy (such as 
majoritarianism), famously highlighted by Alexis de Tocqueville. She 
concludes by probing the affinity that democratic movements can have 
with projects of nationalism as pointed out by Charles Taylor. She 
observes that recent works on religious nationalism in India highlight 
some of these connections between democracy and nationalism. Bhar-
gava for instance, has argued that the Hindu nationalists have been 
able to use the normative vocabulary of the Indian Constitution by 
expanding the meanings of such evaluate terms like democracy and 
secularism so that they begin to signal very different, if not opposed, 
meanings that are normally associated with them. Democracy, for 
example, in the Hindu nationalist agenda means rule by a permanent 
majority; the concept’s requirements such as, all decisions be arrived 
at in ways that have the widest possible range of individual and group 
representation, are subtracted from Hindu Right’s understanding of 
democracy (ibid.: 144). 
A counter to Lamba’s theme of nationalism, is the essay 
“Cosmopolitanism: A Review of Literature in Indian Political Thought” 
by Mohinder Singh. Singh notes that although the idea of cosmopoli-
tanism is quite old in human history, what is new about contemporary 
invocations of cosmopolitanism is that the idea is now aligned with 
what has been called the “cosmopolitanism of reality.” Cosmopolitan-
ism of reality refers to  
the current global situation which is a product of the processes of 
globalization of the last three decades: the growing global 
networks created by the world market; media and internet; 
migration; cross-cultural encounters; proliferation of transnational 
human rights organizations; rise of global cities; emergence of 
hybrid cultures; and large scale and relatively freer travels across 
the world. (Singh 2013: 150)  
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Singh defines cosmopolitanism as “a normative orientation, or an 
ethics, or an ethical attitude” (ibid.: 150-1). He points out that as an 
ethics there is no agreement among the users of the concept of 
cosmopolitanism, except that it requires thinking beyond national 
horizons. As an ethical attitude, it is used as a description of cosmopo-
litan practices, like cosmopolitan styles of certain artistic, literary, and 
architectural practices; practices linked to cosmopolitan travellers etc. 
At the same time, cosmopolitanism is also a thesis about identity and 
belongingness and refers to an orientation of the “self” (ibid.: 151). 
Singh begins his review of cosmopolitanism with Martha Nussbaum’s 
article, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism" (1994), where she develops 
her theoretical position on cosmopolitanism through two philosophical 
positions – that of Stoics, who think of themselves as citizens of the 
world (kosmos polites), and Immanuel Kant’s notion of cosmopoli-
tanism. In Nussbaum’s view the cosmopolitan ideal can be promoted 
only if people consider other intermediary affiliations – such as nation, 
region, religion, and cultural community – as parts of the whole, which 
is the humanity. Kwame Anthony Appiah criticises Nussbaum’s uni-
versalist position for conforming to the image of cosmopolitanism as 
rootless people, and develops a theoretical position which he calls 
“rooted cosmopolitanism” or “cosmopolitan patriotism” (Singh 2013: 
154). Against Nussbaum’s approach, Appiah’s argument is that the 
lover of humanity can be a lover of patria also. Singh observes that 
postcolonial critiques of cosmopolitanism move beyond Eurocentric and 
liberal notions of cosmopolitanism as they find cosmopolitan visions to 
be based on Enlightenment universalism governed by the will to 
control and homogenise. Uday Mehta, for instance, in Liberalism and 
Empire (1999), develops a powerful critique of cosmopolitanism groun-
ded in liberal universalism by showing its historical nexus with 
imperialism (Singh 2013: 154-5). 
With regard to the idea of cosmopolitanism in IPT, Singh argues that 
the idea of Asian continent as a source of non-Western notions of 
cosmopolitanism makes it possible to move beyond Eurocentric notions 
as well as narrow notions of cosmopolitanism. He points out works of 
two thinkers who have received attention in recent literature – 
Rabindranath Tagore and Okakura Tenshin. Rustom Bharucha, for 
instance in his book Another Asia: Rabindranath Tagore and Okakura 
Tenshin (2006), talks about “subaltern cosmopolitanism,” which refers 
to those travellers, particularly non-Europeans, who travel across 
international borders in their capacity as servants or employees of elite 
cosmopolitan travellers. These subaltern cosmopolitan travellers, while 
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have serviced the narratives of cosmopolitanism, remain on the peri-
phery, rendered invisible under conditions of coercion, humiliation, 
economic exploitation and so on (Singh 2013: 162). Singh goes on to 
discuss the idea of cosmopolitanism in Tagore through the works of 
Louise Blakeney Williams (2006), Ramachadra Guha (2011), and P. K. 
Datta (2011). 
He also discusses the idea of “ethical cosmopolitanism” found in 
Uday Mehta’s reading of Mahatma Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj (1999). 
Important within this overall trend of looking beyond the national 
boundaries are works in the field of intellectual history of modern India 
where historians have been able to show the transnational field in 
which the nineteenth and twentieth-century Indian leaders’ ideas are 
located. The works of C.A. Bayly, already discussed in this review 
article, is an example. Thus, Singh provides a comprehensive overview 
of the literature on cosmopolitanism and the attempt to seek alter-
natives to the universalistic cosmopolitanism of liberal modernity in 
IPT. He concludes by stating, “The interesting scenario for the near 
future may be a case of the interaction and clash of various versions of 
cosmopolitanisms in the cosmopolitan public sphere” (Singh 2013: 
182). 
The last essay by Rajarshi Dasgupta entitled, “Ethics and Politics” 
demonstrates just how far the ethical has shaped the explorations of 
the grounds of IPT in various sectors. He begins his survey of the 
ethical dimensions in politics with two nationalist thinkers – M. K. 
Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore. Dasgupta says that there has been a 
call to revisit Gandhi’s thoughts with a set of new and different 
questions, often more practical as well as moral and philosophical 
(Dasgupta 2013: 234). For instance, Surinder Jodhka’s (2002) 
discussion of Gandhi on Indian villages demonstrates how Gandhi 
based his ideas of swaraj on village republics as an alternative to the 
Western city-centric modality of government. Ajay Skaria (2002), on 
the other hand, explores Gandhi’s ashram practices in Sabarmati 
ashram to illustrate how Gandhi conceived the development of an 
alternative modality of politics through a critique of liberal modernity. 
Akeel Bilgrami (2003) further has shown how Gandhi’s notion of 
truth goes against the Western enlightenment idea of truth as a 
cognitive notion. In Bilgrami’s reading of Gandhi, truth must be 
understood as a moral and experiential notion, the satyagrahi 
(Gandhi’s non-violent activists) being a “moral exemplar.” Here the 
notion of “exemplar” in Gandhi involves setting up oneself as an 
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example worthy to follow by everyone (Dasgupta 2013: 235-6). Das-
gupta also identifies Silvia Federici’s (1994) comparative reading of 
Franz Fanon and Gandhi in their respective colonial contexts as 
another provocative interpretation of Gandhi. This approach, Dasgupta 
notes, has thrown up a rich discussion on the respective concepts of 
selfhood and, the contrasting valuation of violence in the two great 
anti-colonial thinkers (ibid.: 237). 
While discussing recent works on Tagore, Dasgupta points out 
Dipesh Chakrabarty’s (2009) critical mediation on the role of “ima-
gination” in Tagore. Chakrabarty, he says, uses the word imagination 
in the context of Tagore’s thought with a particular problem of the act 
of loving the nation: “How do we love, when the object of love daily 
confronts us with despairing sights of poverty, disease, and deca-
dence? [...] How does one think and represent the nation under these 
conditions?” (Dasgupta 2013: 239). Chakrabarty has argued that 
Tagore devised a systematic strategy to tackle this problem through a 
distinction that Tagore created between his prose and poetic visions.  
While Tagore placed prose within the reformist agenda of arti-
culating the ‘real situation,’ his poetry (and songs) animated a very 
different image of the nation. The latter is understood to reveal the 
eternal entity hidden behind the apparent protean reality. Dasgupta 
says that there is a conceptual distance between Chakrabarty’s for-
mulation of Tagore’s imagination from Benedict Anderson’s “empty 
homogenous time” of the nation, where the nation is imagined through 
newspaper circulation and print capitalism. For Chakrabarty, Tagore’s 
poetic visions create a caesura in historical time, affecting a kind of 
transcendence into an imagination that can be distinctly experienced 
(Dasgupta 2013: 240). Other works on Tagore, like P. K. Datta (2010), 
demonstrate how Tagore based his conception of globality and civilisa-
tion in terms of hospitality rather than competition, where the principle 
of interrelatedness of the globe rests on respect and love. 
Dasgupta then transits to a general consideration of the ways in 
which the Self has been conceived in IPT. In this section, he identifies 
the various sites in which different notions of the Self have been 
identified: the Hindutva Self based on highly exclusionary Hinduism; 
the notions of Muslim selfhood; the vernacular translation of the 
Marxist ideology and its entanglements with available notions of 
Brahmanism; jail narratives of political prisoners produced in the 
prison cell in colonial India; and the different conceptions of the urban 
and the rural in modernity producing a deep schism in the notion of 
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the Self. Another important site for ethical intervention, identified by 
Dasgupta, is provided by critiques of development and alternatives to 
the model of development. Such alternatives range from Vandana 
Shiva’s (1988) contrast between masculine domination of nature found 
in Western development and a feminine conception of forestry which 
views forests as part of the ecosystem, the revival of a Gandhian 
approach in Venu Madhav Govindu and Deepak Malghan (2005), to 
Arun Aggarwal’s (2005) conceptual framework of “environmentality” 
based on the Foucauldian idea of governmentality. Finally, Dasgupta 
reviews the ethical readings of classical Brahmanical concepts, such as 
dharma and ahimsa, which are deployed to understand modern 
conditions. 
Let me conclude by outlining some of the changing trajectories of 
IPT, as it emerges from our review of the above discussed literature. 
Firstly, recent works on IPT have taken a thematic turn and departed 
from the traditional model of IPT based on the study of individual 
thinkers. While there are advantages of examining a thinker based 
study of ideas, it poses certain problems, like a figure becomes iconic 
in terms of both thought and political choice. That is, the author – 
especially in modern IPT – is identified with both a body of thought as 
well as the political commitments of that author. Such a framework 
overlooks the deep complicities between different thinkers, the ideas 
that circulate between them, and which are deployed differently in 
different systems of thought (Datta & Palshikar 2013: 14-5). 
Secondly, there is a greater affirmation among authors of modern 
IPT that the application of western ideas and concepts such as 
freedom, equality, modernity, secularism and so on are not simply imi-
tative of western conceptions. Many of the essays and books under 
review here showed the creative adaptation of liberal and democratic 
values by Indian thinkers and leaders, as also the transnational nature 
of western values and concepts themselves. Thirdly, the field of 
political thought has itself expanded such that the very definition as to 
what constitutes the political has broadened. This has resulted in a 
greater interaction and exchange of ideas between not just political 
science, history and philosophy, but also other disciplines like econo-
mics, geography, sociology, psychoanalysis, cultural studies, literature 
and poetry and so on. Lastly, the field of IPT itself has become more 
dynamic and there is growing recognition that the nature of IPT is 
better described by both continuities and discontinuities, and as such 
the tradition of IPT also involves “tensions, short cuts, regressions as 
well as jumps” (Mehta 1992: 5). 
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In this scenario, we end our discussion with the question that we 
posed in the beginning of this review essay, which is: Is IPT better 
described as thought or theory? While the practical orientation of IPT 
clearly stands out in contrast to a theory, Datta and Palshikar argue 
that it is not just a compendium of practices. They opine that it may be 
better understood as “thought that works itself out in practices” (2013: 
8). And yet while IPT is better described as thought, this review article 
shows the productivities and varieties of thought, such that it 
questions the necessity of IPT emerging as a theory. 
                                                          
Endnotes 
1
 As the periodisation of Indian history into ancient, medieval and modern is seen as problematic, 
the editors of Indian Political Thought have chosen to deploy ‘Early Indian’ and ‘Middle Period’ 
Political Thought instead. 
2
 Vajpeyi briefly also considers the question whether there was an epistemological break in 
Muslim knowledge traditions during the same time (1857-1947), that is, the kind of rejuvenation 
and reorientation of tradition that she sees in Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj. 
3
 This is a phrase used by Partha Chatterjee in his book: Nationalist Thought and the Colonial 
World: A Derivative Discourse (1993). Chatterjee here argues that the nationalist thought in India 
is essentially a derivative discourse as it has fashioned itself on the modular form of nationalism 
which developed in the West. 
4 
Kaviraj further argues that sometimes due to repetitive and consistent use, the older 
(vernacular) term is often invested with a new meaning, erasing the conventional (western) one, 
or the two meanings exist side by side, differentiated by native users by the use-context. While 
examining whether there were traditional concepts of freedom in India, he illustrates this point 
with the vernacular term ‘mukti’ that is found in Rabindranath Tagore’s poems. The older term 
mukti (true deliverance) was understood in terms of otherworldliness, and in the implicit belief in 
the cycle of re-birth, both of which were unacceptable to modern consciousness. Tagore re-
conceptualized mukti in his poems in distinctly this-worldly terms such that by the end of 19th 
century, the term came to carry increasingly modern connotations of freedom (Kaviraj 2002: 
104). In contemporary political usage, one can think of this term as used by the Mukti Bahini 
(Liberation army) – the Bengali resistance forces that fought against the Pakistani army during 
the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. 
5 
Datta and Palshikar make a distinction between modern IPT and contemporary IPT where the 
latter is distinguished from the former by the fact that it has been articulated not by nationalist 
activists for whom political thought is a part of their public praxis, but by academics located in 
universities in India and abroad (Datta & Palshikar 2013: 6). 
6 
For instance, see the debate on secularism between Ashis Nandy, T.N. Madan, and Rajeev 
Bhargava in the edited book Secularism and its Critics (1998). Mohinder Singh’s essay on 
Cosmopolitanism in the book under review, Indian Political Thought (2013), also shows how this 
western concept has been complicated in IPT producing multiple understandings of the idea of 
cosmopolitanism. 
7
 In discussing the ideas of freedom in modern India, Sudipta Kaviraj contends that while there 
was no self-conscious tradition of Western type social theorising in India until the 20th Century, 
this does not mean that when Western ideas entered into Indian intellectual and practical life, 
they replaced or supplanted existing ideas. He argues that for studying intellectual history in India 
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it may be more fruitful to combine the contextualism represented by the Cambridge school (like 
for instance, Quentin Skinner and J.G.A. Pocock), and conceptual history produced by Reinhart 
Koselleck and his collaborators. While the former approach focuses on the study of theoretical 
texts to find correct historical meanings of concepts by recovering authorial intention, the latter 
approach focuses less on theoretical constructs and more on practical meanings of individual 
concepts which are central to the successful operation of modern social practices (Kaviraj 2002: 
97-100). 
8 
For a defense of doing Indian political theory through indigenous concepts and categories, see 
Gopal Guru (2011). In this essay Guru argues that in order to “escape” the epistemological grip 
and gaze of the western discourse one needs to use the methodological language of the “desi” 
and the “beyond.” While the desi (indigenous) is self-referential, superior, and autonomous from 
the west, the category of the beyond, the language of dalit discourse, is based on a ‘negative’ 
language, where the ‘authentic’ articulation requires the west as a negative reference point. As 
opposed to the desi, this thought emerged in adversarial intellectual conditions, and is expressed 
through dissonance, difference and defiance. Guru identifies the dalit and shudra thought of B. R. 
Ambedkar, Jyotiba Phule and “Periyar” E. V. Ramaswamy Naicker in this category. 
9 
By ‘communal Hindu’ political figures I mean those Indian leaders and thinkers who were 
engaged with Hindu nationalism during the freedom struggle and who were advocates of 
politicised Hinduism. Madan Mohan Malaviya, a sanatani (orthodox Hindu), was a key figure in 
the Hindu revivalist movement in the United Province (renamed as Uttar Pradesh after 
independence) and the leader of Hindu Mahasabha which emerged in the 1910s as a reaction 
against the extension of a separate electorate in favour of Muslims at the municipal level. 
Malaviya is best remembered for initiating the foundation of the Banaras Hindu University in 
1916 (Jaffrelot 2007: 12).   
10
 Kavya (or poetry) finds its classical expression in the so-called mahakavya (great poem), in the 
strophic lyric, and in the Sanskrit theatre. The great masters of the kavya form were Ashvaghosa, 
Kalidasa, Bana, Dandin, Magha, Bhavabhuti, and Bharavi. The earliest surviving kavya literature 
was written by Ashvaghosa, a Buddhist (Encyclopaedia Britannica). 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/313574/kavya [Retrieved 21.08.2014] 
11
 In order to avoid the criticism of anachronism in arguing that Asokan edicts provided resources 
for formulating India’s conception of modern secularism, Bhargava makes a distinction between 
a “concept” and a “conceptual resource/space.” He says that a reasonably articulated and 
complex concept draws elements from multiple conceptual spaces. Conceptual spaces open up 
simultaneously or over time that enable multiple historical agents to imagine new concepts. A 
conceptual space may open up and may remain unutilized for long periods of time, or it may get 
filled up by concepts which in turn may be clearly formed, or may be semi-developed, or even 
barely born (Bhargava 2014: 173-5). 
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